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Introduction 
The object of this paper is to assess the comparative efficacy of alternative 
economic and organisational strategies. More specifically, it elaborates on the 
basic notion of vertical coordination and market transaction. Vertical 
coordination is a particular institutional arrangement between economic units 
that governs the way in which these units cooperate. 
Vertical coordination relates to governance structure that can be arrayed on a 
continuum ranging from spot-market transactions at one extreme to vertical 
integration at the other. The basic distinguishing criterium that characterizes 
the degree of coordination seems to be the administrative aspect: ranging from 
no control from A on B, to complete control and ownership from A over B. 
The degree of control varies, depending on the nature of the contract, or 
transaction specific arrangements (Williamson, 1975). From an empirical point 
of view, however, the debate on measuring vertical coordination has not yet 
been terminated (Henderson and Frank, 1995). 
In the agribusiness and food industries the problem of vertical coordination or 
chain management is discussed by many (see for example the latest two 
volumes of Agribusiness: an international journal; the Chain management 
congresses in Wageningen, 1992 and 1994; the NE-165 research conference in 
Washington 1995; Barkema and Drabenstott, 1995; Boehlje, Akridge and 
Downey, 1995). In this debate, predictions have been made on the conduct of 
firms within the agri-food value chains. In some cases vertical integration, in 
some other cases spot-markets or vertical alliances have been suggested as 
adequate governance structures. 
In this paper, vertical coordination in the European vegetable industry is 
discussed. More specifically, the question is raised as to what governance 
structure the vegetable industry may expect to encounter in the years leading 
up to the third millennium. In view of their importance, the analysis will focus 
on four European countries: France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. More 
fundamentally, the question is posed as to how market structure influences 
vertical coordination between actors in a national agri-food industry. 
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To answer these questions, some theoretical perspectives with regard to the 
debate on vertical coordination will be introduced. Then a description will be 
given of the European vegetable industry. For predicting the governance 
structure of the industry, major forces exercising influence on the governance 
structure will be analyzed. The paper concludes with some generic conclusions 
on the debate on market structure and governance structure. 
Vertical coordination: the choice of a governance structure 
Vertical coordination is to be defined as the process of coordinating market 
transactions between supplier and customer. Vertical coordination in the 
agribusiness and food industries encompasses several to many transactions, 
including the exchange of inputs from suppliers of seed or of capital to the 
farmer, the exchange of raw materials between farmers and processors, 
auctions by wholesalers or the exchange of processed and fresh produce 
between wholesalers and retailers and retailers and consumers. Apart from the 
exchange in the physical flow of goods, one may distinguish exchange of 
information or other valuable assets. 
Vertical coordination as a governance structure entails many different forms. 
A first distinction that is usually made is between internal and external 
coordination, following the basic distinction of market integration and vertical 
integration. In the market transaction the price expresses the value of the 
transaction. 
On the other hand, vertical integration is defined as the result of a decision by 
a firm to govern the activities backwards or forwards along the value chain. A 
firm, fully integrated on a given input, satisfies all the needs for that particular 
input from internal sources. Likewise, when a firm is fully integrated forward 
for a given output it is self-sufficient in providing internally the demand for 
that product. Fully integrated companies have complete ownership of their 
assets. Hierarchy within the firm translates the value of exchanges in internal 
prices. Between the two extremes many varieties exist. 
Quasi-integration cover forms such as joint-ventures, strategic alliances, joint 
selling, co-making or minority equity investments. 
Considering the extent of integration from an organisational and financial point 
of view, a typology can be drawn of the different forms of governance 
structures (Figure 1). 
The problem of vertical coordination in agribusiness and food industries 
originates from the large number of suppliers of raw material, the length 
distribution channels, the perishability of fresh products and the increasing 
specificities posed downstream, for example by retail companies and con­
sumers. 
308 
High 
Level of 
financial 
interde­
pendence 
Low 
Merger, 
Take-over 
Capital 
venturing 
Joint-venture 
Information 
strategies 
Technical 
agreements 
Co-making 
Vertical Linkage 
arrangements strategies 
Co-selling 
Agent 
Low high 
Level of organizational 
interdependence 
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The increasing demands downstream exercise a great influence on the actors 
upstream. For those actors these demands influence the operations, delivery 
conditions (time, reliability, frequency), logistic decisions, enabling technolo­
gies and investment patterns. 
More specifically, all the actors in the industries are in the process of deciding 
what courses of action are at hand and should be decided upon. More specifi­
cally among the decisions to be taken, they are faced with the question as to 
which governance structure could be most beneficial to them in the long run. 
Factors to be considered 
Market structure 
The degree of rivalry among firms in an industry has long been viewed in 
industrial organisation as largely a function of key market-structural variables 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990). These dimensions include industry concentration, 
strength of industry demand and homogeneity of firms. 
Vertical coordination between firms, may well be understood from the interde-
pendencies. Pennings (1981) categorized nine types of interdependent relations­
hips between buyers and sellers. 
Elaborating on his work, the following basic configurations may be discussed 
here, (table 1). 
Based on the assumptions of Cohen and Cyert (1965), one assumes that 
oligopolist act in concert to maximize joint profits and to distribute the 
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incremental profits according to an equitable side-payment system. These 
premiums are of course very dependent on the ability of rivals to influence the 
price horizontally and on other contractual arrangements. 
Table 1 Basic market-structure configurations 
Number 
of buyers 
Number of sellers 
Small Large 
Small Bilateral monopoly Pure monopsony 
Oligopoly 
Large Pure monopoly Bilateral pure competition 
However what are the performances of firms in successive monopolies, 
successive oligopolies and, even more complex, configurations of oligopolies, 
monopsonies and pure competion in the successive stages of the value system? 
Theoretically, hypotheses are formulated, such as the expected benefits of 
downstream firms in agri-foodsystems, as the result of increased sales and raw 
product prices, and lower economic welfare upstream, depending on the form 
of vertical coordination (Royer, 1995). 
So, depending on the market structure and more closely, the interaction 
between horizontal and vertical interdependencies, one may conclude that the 
market structure, indicated by the level of concentration of firms, influences 
the process of deciding on the optimal governance structure. Vertical 
coordination will be a function of the degree of horizontal and vertical concen­
tration in the industry. 
The theory of the firm is experiencing a renewed interest with the recent 
development in transaction cost theory. 
From a transactional cost point of view, the determining factor is asset 
specificity. According to Williamson (1990), this factor outweighs the other 
key factors: uncertainty and frequency. The notion of asset specificity helps in 
understanding the resource dependency assumption of the relative importance 
of critical resources. Considering the relationships between the three variables, 
one may envisage the following situations (table 2): 
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Table 2: Governance structures depending on uncertainty and asset 
specificity. 
Uncertainty 
High 
Low 
Frequency high: 
integration 
Frequency low: 
contractual 
coordination 
or spot-market 
Spot-markets 
Power balance: 
vertical integration 
Power imbalance: 
contractual 
coordination 
Spot-market 
or contractual 
coordination 
Vertical 
integration 
Contractual 
coordination/ 
vertical integration 
Low for both Mixed 
Asset specificity 
High for both parties 
In general, a high asset specificity for both partners, encourages internal 
coordination. However, if the uncertainty is low, both partners may opt for 
long-term coordination based on contracts. This situation may, in particular, be 
expected if the firms compete in an oligopolistic market structure, where 
dependencies are crucial and switching costs high. 
If uncertainty is high and asset specificity is high, contractual arrangements 
may endanger the high dependency upon each other. Ergo, vertical integration 
may be beneficial to prevent, in principle, any opportunistic behaviour. 
However, if uncertainty is high and asset specificity is low, the firms may opt 
for contractual coordination if the frequency of the transactions is high, or opt 
for the spot-market if the frequency is low. Both firms will have the opportun­
ity to look for best deals at reasonable prices. 
In mixed situations, where parties have asymmetric relationships in asset 
specificity, the power balance will in many cases define the expected outcome. 
So, if asset specificity is high for one and low for the other partner and uncert-
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ainty is low, then opportunistic behaviour may be expected from the stronger 
partner, at least if the switching costs are not too high. Spot-market transac­
tions are likely to occur. If there is a certain power balance between the 
parties, parties may prefer a loose coupling, based on low-profile arrange­
ments. 
However, if asset specificity is high for the one and low for the other partner 
and uncertainty is high, partners may opt for vertical integration. If the power 
relationships between the partners is unbalanced, the less powerful partner may 
not wish to take the risk of possible distortions in the contractual arrange­
ments, while the stronger firm may judge the contractual arrangement to be 
adequate. 
Theories on strategic management 
The strategic management perspective is built on rudimentary theoretical 
notions. Debates on a firm's core activity and its boundaries poses the question 
as to what constitutes the efficient boundary. According to Porter (1980,1985), 
the rivalry in an industry is very much dependent on the power of buyers and 
suppliers, threat of new entrants and threat of substitutes. Also environmental 
factors, such as government interference, exercise some influence on rivalry. 
Rivalry, being a horizontal variable, is put in the value chain system, empha­
sizing the interaction between horizontal and vertical system variabilities. Once 
the power of buyers increases, buyers will tend to cope by favouring cooperat­
ing strategies, such as establishing joint-ventures, co-making or alliances. 
They are the strategic behaviourial variables. 
Using a game theoretic model Bettis and Weeks (1987) showed that avoiding 
competition results in higher profits for the firms concerned. This finding is 
relevant for understanding the more re-active or pro-active way firms try to 
coordinate the industry. 
Summarizing, the decision on the governance structure may be explained by 
market-structural factors, transactional variables and behaviourial variables. 
In this paper some of these factors will be used to predict what governance 
structure may be expected for the European vegetable industry. 
The vegetable industry in Europe 
In 1992 total world vegetable production reached 462 million tonnes 
(FAO,1994). The European Union (EU) accounts for around 10% of world 
vegetable production. Total production in the EU in 1992 was 46 million 
tonnes. During the period 1988-1992, the production increased with 1.9%. The 
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most important vegetable growing countries within the EU are Italy which 
produces 28% of EU vegetable production, Spain 24% and France 13%. The 
most important category of vegetables grown in the EU are vegetables culti­
vated for fruit (45%), of which tomatoes is the most important crop. In 1992 
tomato production accounted for 29% of total vegetable production in the EU 
(12.709 thousand tonnes). 
Worldwide, tomatoes are a major component of the world's total vegetable 
production, accounting for 15% of total vegetable production. In 1992 the 
world's tomato production reached 72 million tonnes (FAO, 1992). 
Due to the perishable nature of vegetables, vegetable-growing usually takes 
place around the main consumer centres. This somewhat restricts foreign trade 
to a mere regional level (Zuurbier and Migchels, 1994). The two major 
exporters of fresh vegetables in the EU are Spain and the Netherlands. Spain 
exported around 13% of national production in 1992, while the Netherlands 
exported over 70% of their national fresh vegetable production. Of this export 
volume the largest share is destined for other EU countries. Germany is the 
largest importer of these vegetables. In 1992 Germany imported 2.692 thou­
sand tonnes of fresh vegetables, of which 45% came from the Netherlands. 
The consumption of fresh vegetables has increased over the last decades, due 
to rising incomes, greater health awareness, increasing demand for high-rate 
vitamin products and general changes in consumer preferences (OECD, 1992). 
The consumption of fresh vegetables in the EU is characterized by a richly 
varied and large supply. Vegetable production varies widely among EU 
countries. Tomatoes, for example, make the differences evident: in Greece 
they eat about 80 kilogrammes of tomatoes per capita per year. The average 
per capita consumption in the northern countries does not exceed 20 
kilogrammes a year. 
Comparison of the vegetable industries in four countries 
As mentioned before, four major players France, Italy, Spain and the Nether­
lands are responsible for a larger part of the EU production and export. To 
compare them, the following indicators are used: production, trade, distribu­
tion and consumption. 
Production 
In terms of volume, Italy and Spain are the largest vegetable producers in 
Europe (table 3). 
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Table 3: Production of vegetables (1992) 
Country 
France 
volume (mill.tonnes) 
7.2(*) 
14 (**) 
10.3 
3.9 
Italy 
Spain 
The Netherlands 
(Source: Eurostat and PGF, 1993) 
(* : 5.6 is marketed; 1.6 produced in home gardens) 
(**: 2 million grown in home gardens) 
The largest category of vegetables grown in the EU are for fruit (45%), of 
which tomatoes are the most important species. 
Trade 
The two major fresh vegetable exporting countries in the EU are the Nether­
lands and Spain (table 4). 
Table 4: Trade of vegetables (1992) -in thousand tonnes-
Country Export Import 
France 634 1.044 
Italy 542 230 
Spain 1.350 114 
The Netherlands 2.795 523 
(Source: Eurostat and PGF, 1993) 
About 85% of the Dutch and 90% of the Spanish exports of fresh vegetables is 
destined for EU member countries, of which Germany is the more important 
recipient. 
Distribution 
The general vegetable distribution structure consists of several functions and 
actors (table 5): 
314 
Table 5: Major actors and functions in the vegetable industry. 
Shipper 
Wholesaler 
Actors: 
Producers 
Auction 
Packer 
Major function: 
production and internal/external distribution 
collection, selling 
collection, customer-made packing 
collection, transport 
procurement, collection, selling 
Consumer-market place selling 
Retailer selling 
There appear to be major differences between the four countries in the study. 
In France production is organized, for a major part, in producer groups. 
These producer groups can be associations, trading unions, co-operatives or 
SICA's (Société d'Intérêt Collectif Agricole), being a sort of sco-operative. 
The number of producer groups has steadily declined over the years. However, 
depending on the produce, they have large market shares, ranging from 85 to 
90% for cauliflower to 40% of total tomato production. The producer groups 
are facilitated by the Comité Economique Agricole, responsible for market 
regulations, promotion, and research. 
The shipping agent focuses on buying a large variety of unpacked produce and 
sells the products in homogenous amounts. For their procurement, they rely on 
independent producers (50%), producer groups (14%), auctions and wholesale 
markets (35%) and imports. 
The major buyers for the shippers are wholesaler dealers (50%), purchasing 
offices of retail companies (25%), and export agents (20%). National distribu­
tion of fresh vegetables in the EU shows a great deal of variation. 60% of the 
total fruit and vegetables purchases are made in supermarkets, "suprettes" 
(= smaller supermarkets) and in hypermarkets, 9% in specialty shops, and 
27% at market places. 
In Italy vegetable production takes place on about 1 million relatively small 
farms. A large part of the produce is bought by collectors, many of them 
relatively small. Wholesale markets play a minor role. However, the number 
of wholesalers and collectors is large, estimated at 30 thousand. Auctions are 
not, in general, an Italian phenomenon. 
The fragmented market structure in production and distribution is also seen at 
the retail end. The density of retail outlets is one of the highest in Europe. The 
number of food retail stores has fallen to 300.000 in 1990, while the number 
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of supermarkets has increased from 1400 in 1981 to 4000 in 1990. The 
hypermarkets have been getting more important lately, mainly concentrated in 
the northern part of Italy. 
Vegetable production in Spain takes place on 650 thousand farms, some of 
them independent private farms and some co-operative organized farms. The 
co-operative farms are to be found in the northern part of the country. Next to 
the number just mentioned, many other farms are engaged in the production of 
vegetables on a small scale. 
There are a variety of functions and actors involved in vegetable distribution in 
Spain. The co-operatively produced volume is sold by the co-operatives at 
wholesale markets. Especially the co-operative ANECOOP takes on a promi­
nent position in the national distribution of fresh vegetables. Besides 
ANECOOP and two big private wholesale companies, there is a number of 
small wholesale companies with a limited assortment, that mainly focus on a 
specific region. Due to the regionalization of the Spanish market, larger and 
smaller regional wholesalers operate in their regions, supplying smaller and 
larger retail companies and shops. The supermarkets buy their vegetables at 
the wholesale markets or directly from the producer. Especially in the largest 
urban areas the wholesale markets play a dominant role. 
In Spain the small traditional stores are still the major outlets for food. Slowly 
but steadily the number of supermarkets and hypermarkets is increasing. The 
total number of stores is slowly decreasing, mainly due to a decline in the 
number of traditional stores. At the end of the eighties the share of the small, 
independent traditional stores was 50-55%, the share of super- and hyper­
markets was around 30%, the share of market places was 7% and the share of 
home-grown vegetables around 12%. 
Around 13% of total fresh vegetable consumption is procured by institutions, 
like restaurants, hospitals etc.; most of these buy their vegetables at the 
traditional small, independent stores (50%). A smaller number (25%) buy their 
vegetables through wholesale companies. 
Production of vegetables in the Netherlands takes place at about 17.500 
farms, of which 5.500 are specialised in glasshouse production (LEI-CBS, 
1994). Compared to 1988, a total decline of around 7%. 
The auctionhouse has a major stake in the distribution of fresh vegetables. 
About 65% of national marketable fresh vegetable production is sold by the 
auctionhouses. The rest of the vegetables is mainly sold on contract basis. 
Selling by auction is an original Dutch, co-operative selling system for member 
growers, where the daily produce is collected and offered via the clock. 
Besides the original function of selling the produce, auctionhouses take care of 
promotion, quality control storage and facilities for delivery. In early 1966, the 
vegetables auctionhouses merged into one product-market oriented 
auctionhouse. 
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The main purchasers at the auction are exporters and wholesalers (55% and 
27% of total turn-over). Only a small part is bought by retailers or the 
processing industry, 9% and 5% respectively. 
In the Netherlands there are about 1500 wholesale companies and intermedi­
aries active in vegetable and fruit. Around 700 wholesale companies focus on 
domestic trade, over 400 on exports and 140 on imports. The total number of 
intermediaries is about 260. 
In 1993 20% of the total number of exporters had a market share of almost 
60% and the 24 largest exporters were responsible for 54% of the total export 
value. 
The specialized vegetables and fruit wholesale companies serve the retail 
specialists, supermarkets, open-air markets, catering companies and other 
customers. The final consumer can buy vegetables at the supermarket, the 
specialist shop, the open-air market or directly at the farm door. The super­
market companies have increased their market share to the detriment of the 
specialist vegetable and fruit shops. They first achieved a market share of 60% 
in 1992. Hypermarkets are not widely available in the Netherlands; they are 
responsible for a 2% market share. The open market place saw its market 
share decline to 14% in 1992. 
Consumption 
Consumption of vegetables differ widely over Europe (table 6). 
Table 6: Consumption of vegetables and per capita consumption 
Country Consumption (1992) Per capita consumption/year 
(thousand tonnes) (kilos) 
France 1.900 42 (1989) 
Italy 9.900 172 (1990) 
Spain 2.600 66 (1991) 
The Netherlands 933 61.5 (1992) 
(Source: PGF 1993, 1995) 
Consumer behaviour shows a demand for variety, sustainable quality and fair 
prices. 
The vegetable industry and the governance structure 
In the introduction the question was raised as to what governance structure the 
vegetable industry may expect towards the third millennium. As mentioned 
before, the decision on the governance structure may be explained by market-
structural factors, transactional variables and behaviourial variables. 
Comparing the four countries on the governance structure, table 7 shows the 
dominant governance structure with regard to the production- distribution 
transactions. 
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Table 7 Dominant governance structure of the vegetable production-
distribution transactions in EU countries 
Country Dominant governance structure 
Italy Spot-market 
France Auction, spot-market 
Spain Spotmarket, contracts 
The Netherlands Auction 
What factors may explain the dominant governance structure? To answer this 
question we refer to the theoretical explanations that have been mentioned 
before. 
The first one, the market structure of the vegetable industry, differs between 
the four countries. Although in the four countries the number of growers is 
vast, the number of buyers differ according to the country considered. The 
number of buyers in the Netherlands is relatively more concentrated compared 
to France, Spain and, in particular, Italy. However, due to the open market in 
the EU, the flow of produce available for buyers may originate from member 
states. This is particularly true for the Netherlands, where the import and re­
export of vegetables is growing rapidly. In 1994 almost half of the total import 
of vegetables and fruit, 2.4 million tonnes, was re-exported again. 
The increasing international trade flows of vegetables enables large buyers to 
procure the produce more easily from different sources, giving them a better 
opportunity to maximize profits and squeeze out margins of producers. 
In a second explanation for the governance structure, the transaction costs 
asset specificity was mentioned as a dominant variable. What are the specific 
assets in the vegetable industry? Not the quality of breeding material (seed, 
young plants): differences in qualities are shrinking, availability is high and 
prices are a small percentage of production costs (Zuurbier and Migchels, 
1994). Not the production technologies, due to the free flow of information 
and expertise by state research institutes and extension agencies. Not the 
collection and distribution technologies as such, although investments in 
cooling facilities and transport are increasing. However, comparing the 
countries' asset specificity is of increasing importance for the larger buyers in 
view of their demand for larger and larger volumes of homogeneous quality 
within an ever shorter delivery cycle. The every-day-delivery - low prices-
(EDDLP) strategy of major retailers, in some cases extended to the efficient 
consumer response (ECR), to achieve increasing efficiency in the food dis­
tribution by continuous replenishment, category management and total system 
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improvement, requires the cooperative efforts of the large distributors/retailers 
and producers. 
In general, growers in Europe are not yet ready for this major challenge. The 
rather small size of horticultural holdings does not fit the new requirements. 
So, the fragmentation of producers will inhibit the deployment of new retail 
and distribution strategies, unless upstream contractual arrangements can be 
made to secure the delivery of larger volumes. So, the actual low level of asset 
specificity in the vegetable industry allows for low coordination efforts. 
However, one would expect that contractual arrangements would increase 
greatly if the new distribution and retail strategies were to be deployed. 
A third factor explaining the governance structure is the internal rivalry in the 
industry and the relative power of buyers and suppliers, the threat of new 
entrants and substitutes. This factor could be interpreted in the following way. 
The spot-market, as a dominant governance structure in Italy and Spain, and to 
a lesser degree in France, is sustained the large numbers of sellers and buyers 
in a saturating market. This means a higher pressure on prices and a tendency 
to cut costs. Opportunities for the individual grower for product innovations 
are minimal; therefore he depends on the upstream initiatives of seed suppliers 
and breeders and downstream on distributors and retailers. The lack of transpa­
rency in the value chain and exchange of information, inhibits the innovations 
in the market place. So, lowering prices and cutting costs go hand in hand, 
jeopardizing the incomes of growers in the EU. 
Adding to this, new entrants are appearing on the horizon, mainly coming 
from member states and in some cases from outside the EU. This only serves 
to increase the amount of stagnation in the vegetable industry. On the medium 
term, the free trade association of Poland, Czechia and Slovakia expected to 
start trading in 1997, as well as the trade agreement between the EU and 
Bulgaria and Rumania, will pose further threats to the EU vegetable producers. 
The conclusion is that strategic behaviour of growers is focused on cutting 
costs. In the industry this behaviour can also be detected among shippers, 
distributors and retailers. The more capital-intensive producers, in the northern 
part of the EU, are at a less favourable stage compared to the competitors in 
the south. This challenge to the northern vegetable industry may favour the 
rise of collaborative strategies. 
Conclusions 
The vegetable industry in the EU is changing towards a more tightly 
coordinated market structure. Vertical coordination is no longer governed by 
spot-market transactions. Contract arrangements are expected to increase, due 
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to changes in the market structure, transaction characteristics and the strategic 
behaviour of the players in the industry. 
The transition is not affecting all the players at the same intensity and speed. 
Or, to put it differently, all players will be faced with the strategic question of 
how to position themselves in the more coordinated industry and value chains, 
but not all will choose to be a partner in the competitive structures in the 
vegetable industry in the next century. 
More fundamentally, the question was posed as to how market structure 
influences vertical coordination between actors in a national agri-food industry. 
This paper has illustrated the validity of the question. More elaboration on 
quantitative modelling may support evidence for the conclusions drawn and 
support policy decisions to be taken at industry and firm level. 
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